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Abstract
The author studies the welfare implications of adjustment programs supported by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). He uses a model where an endogenous borrowing constraint,
set up by international lenders who will never lend more than a debt ceiling, forces the borrowing
economy to always choose repayment over default. The immediate potential welfare cost of
joining a program is driven by IMF conditionality: to be able to borrow from the IMF, the country
has to submit to limits on the consumption of public goods. The beneﬁts derive from the
additional borrowing from the IMF (at a lower interest rate) and/or through a “catalytic effect” on
private loans, which facilitates consumption smoothing over time. Simulations of the dynamic
model in two institutional environments—with and without the IMF—are compared. Results
indicate that when conditionality forces the country to save more, at a cost that does not prevent it
from joining an IMF program, the resulting lower probability of default can induce private lenders
to relax their borrowing constraints. Based on a calibration of the model for the Brazilian
economy, the overall welfare gains associated with IMF programs are relatively small.
JEL classiﬁcation: F32, F33, F34, F41
Bank classiﬁcation: International topicsiv
Résumé
L’auteur étudie les incidences sur le bien-être des programmes d’ajustement ﬁnancés par le Fonds
monétaire international (FMI). Il élabore pour ce faire un modèle doté d’une contrainte endogène
de crédit correspondant au plafond d’emprunt que ﬁxent les prêteurs internationaux et obligeant le
pays emprunteur à toujours préférer le remboursement à la défaillance. En termes de bien-être, le
coût potentiel immédiat de l’adhésion à un programme d’ajustement découle de la conditionnalité
des prêts du FMI : pour recevoir un prêt de cette institution, un pays doit restreindre sa
consommation de biens publics. Les bénéﬁces qu’il en tire consistent dans l’accès élargi aux
crédits du FMI (assortis d’un taux d’intérêt moindre) et/ou dans l’effet catalyseur que produit sur
les bailleurs de fonds privés cette facilité de prêt, qui permet de mieux lisser la consommation au
ﬁl du temps. L’auteur compare les simulations effectuées à l’aide de son modèle dynamique dans
deux cadres institutionnels différenciés par la présence et l’absence du FMI. Ainsi, lorsque la
conditionnalité force un pays à épargner davantage, mais sans que ce coût l’empêche de s’engager
dans un programme du FMI, la réduction de la probabilité de défaillance qui en résulte peut
pousser les prêteurs privés à assouplir leurs contraintes de crédit. D’après les résultats obtenus au
moyen d’un modèle calibré en fonction des caractéristiques de l’économie brésilienne, les gains
de bien-être attribuables aux programmes du FMI sont, dans l’ensemble, plutôt minces.
Classiﬁcation JEL : F32, F33, F34, F41
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Questions internationales1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper is a quantitative study of the welfare implications of adjustment programs supported by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). More speciﬁcally, it investigates whether IMF-supported
programs help countries improve their access to international capital markets, and quantiﬁes the
associated welfare gains.
It is reasonable to argue that IMF programs have been responsible for a large part of the
economic policy carried out by transition and/or emerging economies. In some periods, these
programs have been “the critical element in macroeconomic policy” (Fischer 1997, 23) in those
economies. The question of whether IMF programs actually help the countries that adopt them is
central to the evaluation of the Fund’s performance.
The literature on the evaluation of IMF-supported programs is extensive and largely based on
reduced-form econometric models applied to cross-country samples (Haque and Khan 1998; Barro
and Lee 2002; Mody and Saravia 2003; Joyce 2004; and Bordo, Mody, and Oomes 2004). In
general, these cross-country studiesexamine estimated coeﬃcients from the regressions of selected
macroeconomic variables (current account, overall balance of payments, inﬂation, growth, private
capital ﬂows, etc.) interacted with an IMF program dummy. This approach may not provide the
appropriate metric to evaluate the success of these programs, because there is no clear mapping
between welfare measures and the regression coeﬃcients.
This paper takes a diﬀerent approach to evaluating IMF programs. It considers a model in
the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Kletzer (1984), where an endogenous borrowing
constraint limits the ability of a small open economy to smooth consumption. The economy opti-
mally decides whether it will repay or default on its external debt. The beneﬁt of default (a higher
level of consumption today) is balanced against the costs (an output loss associated with indirect
costs of default plus the exclusion from international capital markets in the future). Foreign lenders
impose a debt ceiling such that the country never chooses to default. This type of borrowing con-
straint prevents full consumption smoothing and thus helps explain part of the excess consumption
volatility (normalized by output volatility) experienced by emerging economies, in comparison with
more developed ones (Resende 2006). Any increase in the relative beneﬁts of default vis-à-vis re-
payment induces the lenders to lower the level of the borrowing constraint, generating even more
consumption volatility. In this context, IMF programs can be welfare improving if they help ease
the constraint and reduce volatility.
In the model, agents derive utility from the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods,
which can be consumed either as private or public goods. The economy can borrow abroad from
private agents or from the IMF, upon formally adopting an adjustment program. The decision to
adopt an IMF program is endogenous. The immediate cost of a program is IMF conditionality:t h e
1country must submit to restrictions on the consumption of public goods in order to borrow from
the IMF. The beneﬁts are twofold: (i) the interest rate on IMF loans is lower than that charged by
private agents, and (ii) there may be additional consumption smoothing if IMF lending positively
aﬀects the total amount of available funds for the country to borrow.
The borrowing constraints related to the two components of total external debt are set up
diﬀerently. While IMF loans are subject to an exogenous institutional limit, there is an endogenous
constraint on the borrowing from private agents, given the ceiling for IMF loans. The IMF can
relax the borrowing constraint on total debt in two ways. First, there is the direct eﬀect of a
higher level of IMF lending for a given level of (maximal) debt from private lenders. Second, IMF-
supported programs may have an indirect, general-equilibrium positive catalytic eﬀect on private
lending, by inducing a relaxation of the endogenous borrowing constraint. The main driving force
behind positive catalysis of private lending is the reduction of the likelihood of default induced by
the incentives and punishments associated with IMF programs. If they reduce the ex ante relative
incentives to default, then private lenders may relax their borrowing constraint.
The likelihood of default is aﬀected by IMF programs when they induce a higher ex ante propen-
sity to save through conditionality. It is shown numerically that this mechanism does not work
when the consumption of public goods is optimally chosen: when conditionality is too strong, the
economy avoids IMF programs, since the forced savings are too costly with regards to suboptimal
levels of public goods consumption. In that case, the country does not increase savings. When con-
ditionality is less strict, IMF program participation is positive, but there are no additional savings
either, because the economy is already optimizing at a level of public goods consumption that is
lower than that required by conditionality.
In an alternative set-up, the economy cannot commit to a low level of public goods consumption
unless it signs an IMF program. In this case, when the IMF acts as a “commitment device,”
conditionality can simultaneously force a higher propensity to save while driving the economy
closer to the optimal allocation. As a result, IMF program participation is positive and has a
positive catalytic eﬀect on private lending.
The model is calibrated to the Brazilian economy. Two relevant questions regarding IMF-
supported programs can be answered based on the results. First, can conditionality, in the form
of restrictions on domestic absorption (in the model, limits on the consumption of public goods),
help relax the borrowing constraint imposed by private foreign lenders? That is, can conditionality
produce a positive catalytic eﬀect on the country’s access to international private capital markets?
Second, for reasonable values of the structural parameters, what are the welfare gains associated
with a less stringent constraint on international borrowing?
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model is described in section 2
and a quantitative exercise is presented in section 3. Section 4 oﬀers some conclusions.
22 The Model
This section extends a model in the tradition of Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Kletzer (1984) by
incorporating an endogenous decision to adopt an IMF program. Speciﬁc components of the model
are discussed, such as preferences, stochastic endowments, the characterization of international
capital markets, the resource constraints, the endogenous borrowing constraint on external debt,
and the IMF.
2.1 Preferences
Consider a small open economy, where a central planner seeks to maximize the lifetime utility of
a representative agent. The agent enjoys utility from the consumption of both private and public





where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor, and the function u is strictly concave and strictly
increasing in both arguments, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and satisﬁes the Inada conditions
with respect to both arguments.
Indexes ct and gt are constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregators of the consumption





























t denote consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods as private goods, re-
spectively, and gT
t and gN
t have similar denotations for public goods. The parameters µc and µg
determine the elasticities of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods within the in-
dexes ct and gt,g i v e nb y1/(1 + µi) > 0, i = c,g, respectively. The weights of tradables in the
respective indexes are ωc and ωg,b o t hi nt h e[0,1] interval.1
2.2 Endowments
The supply side of the economy is characterized by:
yN
t = yN, (4)
yT
t = yT + zt. (5)
1It is common to associate public goods with services, which are non-tradable goods. One interpretation of (3)
is that the planner takes part of the endowments of both tradable and non-tradable goods, produces gt according to
the CES technology, and then allocates the “output” to the representative consumer.










, received by the representative agent, respectively.
The only source of uncertainty in the model is the shock to the tradable endowment, zt ∈ ΩZ,w h i c h
is assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order Markov chain with transition probabilities given by π(zt|zt−1)
over the compact set ΩZ.
The introduction of tradable and non-tradable goods is not crucial. However, it adds some
interesting dynamics through movements in the real exchange rate (pt) as deﬁn e db yt h er e l a t i v e
price of non-tradables in terms of tradables. In particular, the volatility of any aggregate variable
Xt = xT
t +ptxN
t ,f o rX = C,G,Y and x = c,g,y, will depend not only on the exogenous underlying
volatility associated with the stochastic process for zt, but also on the endogenous volatility of pt.2
2.3 External debt
It is assumed that international asset/capital markets are incomplete and that no contingent con-
tracts are available.3 The economy can always borrow dt ∈ D ⊆ R from private lenders (or
“banks”). It can also borrow ft ∈ F ⊆ R+ from the IMF only if it agrees to sign an adjustment
program and comply with the conditions imposed by the Fund, as discussed in section 2.6 and
Appendix A. Both types of loans4 are expressed in units of the tradable good, and are contracted
at time t − 1,t ob ep a i da tt i m et. Loans from banks charge the constant interest rate, r,w h i l e
Fund loans are signed at a lower interest rate, r∗ <r .
The assumption of lower interest rates on IMF loans has both theoretical and technical/computational
implications (section 2.6). On the one hand, it aﬀects the relative incentives to default and, as a
consequence, the possibility of positive catalysis of private loans by IMF lending. On the other
hand, it helps to substantially reduce the computational cost of the model’s numerical solution,5
while being representative of actual IMF lending.6
The total external debt, d∗
t ∈ D, observed at the end of every period t,i s :
d∗
t = dt + IMFtft, (6)
where the discrete-choice variable IMFt takes the value of 1, if the country optimally decides to
adopt an IMF program, or 0 otherwise.
2Arellano (2005) notes an interrelated reason for having tradable and non-tradable goods in this type of model.
The relative size of the tradable sector has a negative eﬀect on the probability of default, ceteris paribus.
3This diﬀers from Kehoe and Levine (1993), who discuss endogenous borrowing constraints with complete markets.
The assumption of incomplete markets used in this paper seems to better reproduce the evidence that countries tend
to default during hard times. See Arellano (2005).
4We refer to loans, but the analysis is equally valid for debt in the form of bonds.
5For instance, when combined with an upper limit on ft imposed by the IMF (see section 2.6), the planner’s
problem is well deﬁned, and the economy will always borrow up to that limit when it decides to borrow from the
IMF. In that case, the state-space for ft can be discretized into only two points, consisting of zero and that upper
limit.
6From 1981 to 2005, the average annual “rate of charge” (the interest rate on IMF loans) was about 5.3 per cent
a year, while sovereign bond yields from IMF borrowing countries, such as Brazil, paid more than 12 per cent a year.
4Following Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), there is no commitment technology that forces the coun-
try to repay its external debt. The choice between defaulting or repaying the debt is endogenous.
Should the planner optimally choose to default at time t, it is assumed that: (i) default would
occur in both types of loans (i.e., countries cannot default on IMF loans and repay private loans,
and vice versa), and (ii) international lenders, both private banks and the IMF, would exclude the
country from intertemporal asset trading forever.7 That is, the country not only faces a discrete
choice of joining an IMF program, but must also choose between default (DEFt =1 )or repayment
(DEFt =0 ) . The discrete choices involving both IMFt and DEFt are explained in section 2.6.
2.4 Resource constraints
The economy is subject to two resource constraints. For the non-tradable good, the constraint is:
cN
t + gN
t = DEFtλyN +( 1− DEFt)yN, (7)
where λ ∈ (0,1).
The (1 − λ) reduction in yN,w h e nDEFt =1 , is a reduced-form way of introducing an “output
loss” due to indirect costs associated with the default state.8 The factor λ is eﬀective as long
as the economy remains in the default state. Given the assumption of permanent exclusion from
international capital markets in case of default, this cost is permanent.9








t − (1 + r)d∗
t−1 +( r − r∗)IMFt−1ft−1
¤
. (8)
Notice that, in case of full repayment, the available resources for consumption, after servicing
the outstanding debt, come from the endowment and/or new loans. The last term in (8) accounts
for the fact that part of d∗
t−1(i.e., IMFt−1ft−1) is contracted at the lower interest rate, r∗.I nc a s e
of default, the country does not pay the debt services, cannot contract d∗
t, and must consume the
endowment reduced by the factor λ.
7In reality, defaulting countries are able to borrow again after some renegotiation of their debts. In terms of the
model presented in this paper, the penalty for defaulting countries is higher than what actually occurs. Arellano
(2005) introduces an exogenous probability of leaving the default state at each period. Yue (2004) endogenizes the
renegotiation process as a Nash bargaining game between the sovereign and the creditors.
8These costs may include disruption in the countries’ ability to engage in international trade, sanctions imposed
by foreign creditors, or damages caused to the ﬁnancial system (Cole and Kehoe 1998). For instance, Chuhan and
Sturzenegger (2003) ﬁnd that the per cent contraction in output in Latin America, following the default episodes in
the 1990s, was about 2 per cent.
9As in other empirical studies that rely on real business cycle models based on Eaton and Gersovitz’s (1981)
framework (Arellano 2005; Aguiar and Gopinath 2004), λ is necessary for calibration purposes. For reasonable values
of the structural parameters, the threat of ﬁnancial autarky alone cannot generate the debt-to-output ratios observed
in actual indebted economies.
52.5 The borrowing constraint
The lack of commitment to repay the external debt introduces another imperfection to the interna-
tional capital markets, in addition to the fact that they are incomplete. The possibility of choosing





















t and V D
t are the time-t values of the indirect utility obtained by the representative agent
in the states of repayment and default, respectively, and St = {zt,f t−1,IMF t−1} is a partition of





∈S = [D × ΩZ × F ×{ 0,1}].
T h ec o n s t r a i n t( 9 )d i ﬀers from others used in the literature, often speciﬁed arbitrarily outside
economic models.10 It captures the notion that borrowers face credit limits that depend not only
on their characteristics, but also on their income streams and the endogenous current state of the
economy. Notice that d
∗
t is the maximal amount of funds that the domestic economy can borrow,
including private and IMF loans, without triggering the strategy of optimal default. As implied by
the constraints (7) and (8), there are two costs associated with the default option. First, there is the
output loss given by (1 − λ). Second, since it must stay in ﬁnancial autarky forever once it chooses
to default, the country loses the ability to use international borrowing to smooth consumption in
the future. More consumption volatility is welfare-reducing, because of the concavity of the agent’s
utility function. On the other hand, the beneﬁt of default is the possibility of higher consumption
at t. In terms of default, costs are intertemporal, and beneﬁts are immediate. The planner balances
the costs against the beneﬁtt oc h o o s et h ev a l u eo fDEFt, and decides to default at t whenever
V R
t <VD
t . Repayment takes place whenever V R
t ≥ V D
t .
To force the country to pay back its debt in all possible dates and states, fully informed in-
ternational lenders will set up and enforce the rule formally deﬁned in (9), and will not lend any
amount of funds that makes the planner choose default over repayment. That is, lenders will deﬁne
the credit limit for the borrowing country, d
∗
t, such that its representative agent’s expected lifetime
utility from participating in the asset market is at least as high as that of staying in ﬁnancial
autarky. The approach used for the identiﬁcation of d
∗
t, proposed by Zhang (1997), is based on the
worst-case scenario given by the minimal value of zt in ΩZ.
2.6 The IMF
To introduce the IMF is introduced into the model, let θt ∈ Θ =
©
θ0,θ1ª






, which characterize the IMF conditionality rule. The country must satisfy
ad i ﬀerent rule depending on its choice of wheter to adopt an IMF program. The collection Θ
10For example, see Aiyagari and Gertler (1991), Telmer (1993), and Lucas (1994). In the international macroeco-
nomics literature, examples include papers in the “sudden stop” literature, such as Mendoza (2001).
6contains two types of conditionality sets:
if IMFt =0 : θt = θ0 =
©
DEFt ∈ {0,1}; dt ∈ D; ft =0 ; 0 ≤ gi
t, i = T,N
ª
, (10)
if IMFt =1 : θt = θ1 =
©
DEFt =0 ; dt ≥ 0; 0 ≤ ft ≤ f<∞; 0 ≤ gi
t ≤ gi, i = T,N
ª
. (11)
IMF conditionality is “turned on” when the country chooses to adopt an IMF program. When-
ever IMFt =1 , the economy is subject to θt = θ1, indicating additional restrictions regarding the
default choice, the level of debt from private banks and from the IMF, and the consumption of
public goods. For instance, embedded in the conditionality rules above, there are four assumptions
about the behaviour of the IMF:
(i) the IMF will not lend to a country that chooses to default or does not need to borrow;
(ii) there is an upper bound, gi,f o ri = T,N, to the consumption of public goods when IMFt =1 ;
(iii) countries cannot lend to the IMF; and
(iv) the IMF does not have “deep pockets,” being limited to lend up to f.
The way the IMF is characterized, as represented by assumptions (i) to (iv), is exogenous and
not a result of any optimizing behaviour. From a positive perspective, the Fund’s behaviour is
modelled based on what seems to occur in actual IMF adjustment programs: whenever a country
requires ﬁnancial assistance, the IMF follows its mandate to lend, conditional upon the borrowing
country accepting some (potentially) costly conditions in terms of economic policy. These policies
typically include restrictions to the domestic absorption, often in the form of caps on government
spending, here represented by limits on the consumption of public goods.
The part of assumption (i) that deals with default, which requires DEFt =0whenever IMFt =
1, simply restates the previous assumption that, once a country defaults, it cannot borrow abroad
from t onwards. The remaining part of assumption (i) is required to prevent a country from
borrowing from the IMF at a lower interest rate and lending to private banks at the market
rate. This is consistent with the Fund’s concern about lending only when there is a “balance of
payments need” and when countries “cannot ﬁnd suﬃcient ﬁnancing on aﬀordable terms to meet
its net international payments.”11 Given its public nature as an international organization, it is
hard to justify providing subsidized loans to countries that are not in need.12
Assumption (ii) is motivated by the fact that restraint on central government expenditure (a
proxy for the consumption of public goods) is indeed a key element for the Fund to approve an
11See the “factsheet” on IMF lending at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/howlend.htm.
12Corsetti, Guimarães, and Roubini (2004) develop a static model of IMF optimal lending in which the issue of no
subsidized loans by the IMF−when there is no expected gain in terms of improving a borrowing country’s external
payments position−is explicitly taken into account.
7arrangement (Mussa and Savastano 1999). Whenever the constraint gi
t ≤ gi, i = T,N, is binding,
the consumption of public goods will be set at suboptimal levels and IMF conditionality will be a
cost, at least in the short run.
At least two ﬁndings in the empirical literature indicate that restrictions on the consumption
of public goods are implemented by countries borrowing from the IMF, and that those restrictions
would not take place, or not to the same extent, without the Fund’s support. First, countries
that seek the IMF’s assistance tend to follow more expansionary ﬁscal policies (Table A.1, in
Appendix A, shows that six out of eight empirical studies ﬁnd that government spending, or a
government deﬁcit, increases the likelihood that a country will adopt an IMF program). Second,
there is a negative relationship between the adoption of an IMF program and the rate of growth of
government consumption (Conway 1994; Killick, Malik, and Manuel 1995; Marchesi 2003).
Regarding assumption (iii), most resources for IMF loans are provided by member countries, pri-
marily through their quota payments, which is not the same as lending to the IMF. Although conces-
sionary lending and debt relief to low-income countries are ﬁnanced through separate contribution-
based trust funds, this is not the case for the adjustment programs.13
Assumption (iv) implies an asymmetry in how private and IMF lending are limited by credit
suppliers. The latter is exogenously limited by f, while the former has the endogenous limit
dt = d
∗
t − f, as implied by (9). Because of the diﬀerence in interest rates charged in private and
Fund loans, an upper bound on ft is needed for a well-deﬁned problem: the lower interest rate on
IMF loans favours the substitution of debt from private agents by IMF loans and, if there is no limit
on ft, the economy can borrow a large (inﬁnity) amount from the IMF and then default on both
types of debt.14 However, the overall eﬀect of diﬀerent interest rates on the likelihood of default is
ambiguous, since lower interest rates from the IMF may also imply a higher intertemporal cost of
default: defaulting countries will not only be prevented from borrowing abroad in the future, but
will also lose access to cheaper loans from the IMF. The former (substitution) eﬀect will increase the
likelihood of default and force private lenders to be more strict when they set up their borrowing
constraint, while the latter (intertemporal eﬀect) will increase the cost of default and allow lenders
to relax their borrowing constraint.
Ideally, one would like to model explicitly the behaviour of the IMF, as well as allow for sep-
arate decisions about defaulting only on IMF loans, but not on private loans, or vice versa. This
would eliminate the asymmetry, by allowing an endogenous borrowing constraint for the IMF loans
similar to dt. However, this would considerably increase the state-space of the problem and, as
13The assumption is really not necessary, since the country would always prefer to lend to private banks, at a higher
interest rate. However, in terms of the numerical method used for the solution of the model, it is always convenient
to restrain the state-space for computational purposes.




8a consequence, the computational cost of the numerical solution.15 To keep things simple, the
approach used here ﬁxes f such that dt is determined given (that is, as a function of) f and the
country never defaults.16 Nevertheless, if f i ss e tt o oh i g h ,t h ec o u n t r yw o u l de n du pb yb o r r o w i n g
only from the IMF.17
One way to interpret the exogenous and constant value of f is as an institutional rule that
ensures that ft < ∞. For instance, countries usually cannot borrow in excess of 300 per cent of
their quotas and, although exceptional access criteria do exist, they depend on country-level analysis
by the Fund and are ultimately limited by the Fund’s budget. The quota that each member of the
IMF is assigned to is based broadly on its relative size in the world economy. Quotas are reviewed
at least every ﬁve years, but revisions are not frequent,18 implying that f is country-speciﬁca n d
changes slowly over time.
Thus, the optimal choice in terms of wheter adopt an IMF program is based on the net eﬀect
of conditions (10) and (11). On one hand, the country has more options for borrowing, including
cheaper loans from the IMF, but must optimize subject to caps on the consumption of public goods.
On the other hand, the country loses the option of borrowing from the IMF, but may freely choose
the consumption allocations.
2.7 The planner’s problem
Formally, the planner’s problem is to maximize the objective function (1) subject to constraints (2)





t,d t,f t,IMF t,DEF t}∞
t=0. The timing of events,





is known, the central planner decides:
(i) whether the outstanding debt (both from private banks and from the IMF), including interest
services, is going to be repaid or defaulted, and (ii) whether to sign an agreement with the IMF.
Then, international lenders set d
∗
t,g i v e nf. Finally, given expectations about the next realization
of the shock, and the endogenous borrowing constraint, the planner chooses the next-period levels
of the endogenous state and control variables.
The planner’s problem admits a recursive formulation. Recall that, given the deﬁnitions of ct









addition, let the time subscript t be excluded from the (indirect) utility functions so that V D and
V R represent time-invariant value functions.
15We leave this for future research.
16Note that, because r
∗ <r , it would always be in the interest of the economy to ﬁrst default on the debt from
private lenders.
17This means that, by changing the value of f from zero to a value that is high enough, it is possible to generate
diﬀerent shares of IMF lending on the total debt in the [0,1] interval. In the calibration exercise for the Brazilian
economy discussed in section 3, f is calibrated to match a realistic f/d
∗
t ratio.
18For instance, in 1998 the quota review led to a 45 per cent increase in IMF quotas, but the review concluded in
J a n u a r y2 0 0 3r e s u l t e di nn oc h a n g ei nq u o t a s .
9Time t-1  Time t  Time t+1
1 − t IMF  is known  Adopt an IMF program?        Private lenders and   Planner decides 
*
1 − t d  is inherited              Default or repay?       the IMF set 
*
d    *





t g c c  and  N
t g  
   t z  is realized                                                                    
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
In the default case, the country cannot choose the IMF option, which implies that IMFt =0 .
The planner has to choose optimal decision rules for cT
t ,c N
t ,gT
t ,a n dgN
t in order to solve the
following Bellman equation:

































t , IMFt, ft,a n dd∗
t is required for the



























where St = {zt,f t−1,IMF t−1}t , ft ∈F ⊆ R+,a n dd∗







t = yT + zt + d∗
t − (1 + r)d∗
t−1 +( r − r∗)IMFt−1ft−1;
d∗















= V D (zt)
o
;
if IMFt =0:DEFt ∈ {0,1}; dt ∈ D; ft =0 ; 0 ≤ gi
t, i = T,N;
if IMFt =1:DEFt =0 ; dt ≥ 0; 0 ≤ ft ≤ f<∞; 0 ≤ gi
t ≤ gi
t, i = T,N.
10The solution consists of three objects: (i) a set of state-contingent optimal decision rules for
the level of next-period debt with private lenders, for the IMF program indicator binary variable,
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(St). Given the solution, the underlying probability distribution function of the
shock, jointly with the decision rules, determines the transition and limiting distributions of all
endogenous variables in the model.
Note that, in this set-up, whenever the country chooses IMFt =1 , it will always decide to
withdraw the totality of the resources made available by the Fund (i.e , ft = f), because there
is substitution in borrowing from private banks, at interest rate r, and from the Fund, at a lower
(ﬁnancial) cost. Once the country accepts the cost of conditionality, it will always borrow from
the IMF up to the limit, at a lower interest rate, and supplement its borrowing needs from private
banks. Also note that, although default is a possible choice for the planner, for any given value
of f, there will be no default at the optimum, since condition (9) will force the planner to always
choose DEFt =0 .
In the empirical application of the model, we use a constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA)




















,i fγ =1 ,
where γ>0 is the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution on the composite
CES consumption index (or the risk-aversion parameter), δ ∈ [0,1] gives the weight of private
consumption in the aggregator, and 1/(1 + ν) > 0 is the elasticity of substitution between the
consumption of private and public goods.




















, if IMFt =0 , (13)
=












, if IMFt =1 ,
PT
t = β (1 + r)E tPT
t+1, (14)
11where pt ≡ PN
t /PT
t is the equilibrium level of the real exchange rate, as measured by the relative
(shadow) price of non-tradable with respect to tradable goods; PN
t and PT
t are the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the non-tradable and tradable resource constraints, respectively; and
qN
t and qN
t are the Lagrange multipliers for the conditionality rule gi





t +( 1− δ)g−ν
t
¤(γ−ν−1)/ν. Notice that, when IMFt =1and the conditionality
rule is binding, there is a wedge between the optimal levels of consumption of public goods with and
without the IMF program. This wedge represents the potential cost of conditionality, preventing
the shadow prices PN
t and PT
t from being equal to the marginal utility of the consumption of
public goods as non-tradables and tradables, respectively. Ultimately, it is the net eﬀect of this
(suboptimal, welfare reducing) wedge and the reduced consumption volatility when the IMF helps
relax the borrowing constraint that will matter in the decision oo whether to adopt an IMF program,
and for the welfare implications of those programs, as examined in the next section.
3 A Quantitative Analysis of IMF Programs
In this section, quantitative implications of the model are presented. We calibrate the artiﬁcial
economy to match Brazilian data during the 1980Q1−2004Q2 period, and then compare the be-
haviour of the model under two diﬀerent institutional environments: with and without the IMF.
Table 1: Targeted Average Long-Run Ratios
“Big ratios” Values
1. Share of tradables in total output kT =0 .4045
2. Debt-to-output ratio (private lenders) kd =0 .2597
3. Debt-to-output ratio (IMF loans) kf =0 .0136
4. Government share in total output kg =0 .2057
5. Frequency of IMF program participation α =0 .5102
The calibration procedure (see Appendix B for a more detailed description) takes as reference
a long-run situation in which E(zt)=0and the values of the tradable endowment and the real
exchange rate are normalized to yT = p =1 . Let variables without the time subscript, t, indicate
long-run averages and let Y =
¡
yT + pyN¢
, the total endowment in units of tradable goods, be the
model’s proxy for total output. We target ﬁve long-run ratios: (1) the average share of the tradable
output in total output, kT = yT/Y; (2) the average debt-to-output ratio from bank loans, kd = d/Y ;
(3) the average debt-to-output ratio from Fund loans, kf = f/Y; (4) the ratio of government




and (5) the frequency with which the economy participates in an IMF program, α.T a b l e1s h o w s
the long-run ratios computed from Brazilian data.19
19Data on GDP, tradable GDP (proxied by the GDP excluding the sum of before-taxes GDP for services and the
construction industry, plus a ﬁnancial dummy), and government spending were obtained from the Instituto Brasileiro
de Geograﬁa e Estatística (IBGE). Total external debt corresponds to the net external debt (external debt minus
12Exploring the recursive formulation of the central planner’s problem, a numerical solution is ob-
tained using the value function iteration method, with discretization of the state-space S. The dis-
crete grids used to represent the continuous supports for d∗
t, zt,a n dft contain 602, 5,a n d2 points,
respectively. The d∗
t grid implies debt-to-output ratios approximately in the range [−0.4,2.83],a n d
is appropriately chosen to include the ergodic space. The stochastic process for the production
shock mimics a ﬁrst-order autoregressive process of the type zt = ρzt−1 + εt,w i t hεt v N (0,σε),
ρ =0 .7188,a n dσε =0 .0229, and it is discretized into a ﬁve-point Markov chain using Tauchen’s
(1986) procedure.20
Table 2: Summary of the Calibration Procedure
Exogenous variables Values Motivation
1. Interest rate (IMF loans) r∗ =0 .0081 U.S. bonds deﬂated by CPI
2. Interest rate (private loans) r =0 .0282 C Bond spread over U.S. bonds
3. Average tradable output yT =1 .0000 Normalization
4. Average real exchange rate p =1 .0000 Normalization
5. Non-tradable output yN =1 .4722 kT = yT/
¡
yT + pyN¢
Structural parameters Values Motivation/Target
1. Risk aversion γ =1 .5000 Standard






3. Subjective discount factor β =0 .9726 β (1 + r)=1
4. Elasticity of substitution between c and gν =2 .1500 1/(1 + ν)=0 .3175
5. Elasticity of substitution between cT and cN µc =4 .6600 σy =2 .76%
6. Elasticity of substitution between gT and gN µg =4 .6600 Symmetry with c








8. Weight of tradables in CES g aggregator ωg =0 .0893 Symmetry with c
9. Autocorrelation for zt = ρzt−1 + εt ρ =0 .7188 OLS estimation
1 0 .S t d .d e v .f o rzt = ρzt−1 + εt σε =0 .0229 OLS estimation
11. Conditionality rule on gi ¡
% yi¢
, i = T,N gi =2 0 .9417 α =5 1 .02%












As previously noted, the assumption that r>r ∗ ensures ft = f whenever IMFt =1 ,w h i c h




and substantially reduces the dimension of the state-space
and the computational cost of the numerical solution. The economy gets ft =0when the planner
chooses IMFt =0 , and a standard loan, f, whenever IMFt =1 .T h ev a l u eo ff is calibrated to
match the average value of IMF loans as a proportion of the GDP observed in Brazil.21 Table 2
international reserves) for the period 1982Q4−2004Q2 and is available from the Banco Central do Brasil. IMF loans
and country participation in IMF programs were obtained from the IMF. In computing kd, “private loans” are simply
all outstanding external debt not contracted from the IMF, and may include other sources than private banks, such
as loans from the World Bank and other multilateral agencies.
20The points in the grid h ΩZ = {z1,...,z5} are such that y
T
t > 0 at all times.
21It also satisﬁes the condition d
∗
t − f>0,a sd i s c u s s e di nf o o t n o t e14.
13displays the calibrated values of the remaining exogenous variables r, r∗, yN,a n dgi, i = T,N,
and structural parameters γ, δ, β, ν, µc, µg, ωc, ωg,a n dλ.
The algorithm used in the numeric solution is the following. For each iteration j,g i v e nt h e
discretized state-space and an initial guess for the borrowing constraint, d
∗(j)
, the unconstrained










, are computed through iteration on the Bellman equation.22





such that d∗(j) > d
∗(j)
,w es e td∗(j) = d
∗(j)
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Tables 3 and 4 show the average results of 500 simulations of a time series of 98 quarters, correspond-
ing to the 1980Q1−2004Q2 period. The actual Brazilian series for private consumption, government
consumption, and GDP, expressed in per capita values at average prices of 1991Q1, are taken from
the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada (IPEA), available at http://www.ipeadata.gov.br.
They are consistent with data from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial
Statistics when they happen to overlap. Data on external debt and GDP in U.S. dollars, used
to compute debt-to-GDP ratios, are obtained from the Banco Central do Brasil. Both the actual
and simulated series for consumption and GDP are transformed previous to the computation of
their second-moment statistics, as follows. First, all the variables are expressed in logarithms.
Second, for the actual series, a seasonal adjustment on the log-variables is implemented using the
multiplicative ratio-to-moving-average method. Finally, a smooth trend is subtracted by using the
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter with a smoothing parameter of 1600.
Table 3: Results I
Data Model
Variable Brazil Unconstrained Constrained
(%) (1980Q1−2004Q2) No IMF IMF No IMF
σc 3.63 1.53 1.99 2.02
σy 2.76 2.41 2.76 2.79
G/Y 20.60 20.76 20.79 20.78
d∗/Y 27.33 33.42 27.52 27.38
d/Y 25.97 33.42 26.17 27.38
f/Y 1.36 − 1.34 −
α 51.02 − 56.27 −
22This step itself requires initial guesses for the value functions, and the iterations on the Bellman equation are
undertaken until convergence.
14In general, the baseline model calibration of a borrowing-constrained economy with the option
of seeking the IMF’s assistance is able to match the data well. Note that the calibration implies
good approximations to the debt-to-output ratios (both from private lenders and from the IMF),
the consumption of public goods as a proportion of the GDP, and Brazil’s participation in IMF
programs.
In Table 3, σc and σy represent the volatility of (the log of) total private goods consumption and
total GDP, in units of tradable goods, as given by Ct = cT
t +ptcN
t and Yt = yT
t +ptyN, respectively.
Note that the comparison between the constrained and unconstrained economies shows that the
borrowing constraint increases consumption and GDP volatility from 1.53 per cent and 2.41 per
cent, respectively, in the unconstrained economy (with no IMF), to 1.99 per cent and 2.76 per cent
in a constrained economy when the Fund is present, and to 2.02 per cent and 2.79 per cent when it
is not. That is, given that the economy faces a borrowing constraint, the IMF means less volatility.
Although the model generates a higher relative consumption volatility (72.1 per cent) in compar-
ison with the unconstrained economy without the IMF option (63.5 per cent), it cannot reproduce
the absolute level of consumption volatility observed in the data. This is a shortcoming, because
consumption is more volatile than output in emerging economies (Resende 2006), which means
that other sources of consumption volatility may be missing from the analysis, such as interest rate
shocks (Neumeyer and Perri 2004) or permanent shocks to the growth rate of productivity (Aguiar
and Gopinath 2004), as well as commodity-price shocks and the lack of well-developed domestic
credit markets for households.23
The comparison between the constrained economies with and without the IMF seems to suggest
that IMF loans crowd out private loans, having a negative catalytic eﬀect. In Table 3, note that,
despite the small increase in total debt when the IMF is present, the amount of private loans is
higher with no IMF, and the diﬀerence is almost totally accounted for by Fund loans. Nevertheless,
even though private loans behave as substitutes for Fund loans (rather than as complements to
them), the country’s access to international capital markets is indeed facilitated by the Fund,
because the direct eﬀect of IMF lending makes the borrowing constraint on total debt less stringent
(Table 4).
Potentially, the increase in available funds for the country to borrow, in the model, may come
from two sources. First, there is the direct increase due to the possibility of borrowing from
the Fund, given the maximum amount of private loans. Second, there is the possibility that the
borrowing constraint d
∗
t may be positively aﬀected by a general-equilibrium eﬀect of the country’s
decision to join an IMF program, when this decision reduces the likelihood of default on the external
debt. If the borrowing constraint on private loans, d
∗
t −f, turns out to be higher than it would be
23I thank Larry Schembri and Robert Lafrance, of the Bank of Canada, for suggesting these two other potential
sources of consumption volatility in emerging economies.
15in the absence of the IMF, then there is positive catalysis of private capital ﬂows by IMF lending.
In the above exercise, the opposite situation is observed (Table 4), since d
∗
t −f is lower for the case
with IMF, regardless of whether the economy is participating in an IMF program at period t − 1.
Table 4 shows that, considering the triplet
¡
IMFt−1,f t−1,gi¢
, there is no diﬀerence in d
∗
t be-
tween the model without the IMF and the model with the IMF when IMFt−1 =0 .24 However,
the borrowing constraint on total debt is less stringent when IMFt−1 =1 . Given the country’s
participation in IMF programs reported in Table 3, this means that in 56 per cent of the time, the
economy has more room for consumption smoothing than it would if it did not have the option of
seeking the Fund’s assistance. In the constrained economies, as shown in Table 3, the lower volatil-
ity associated with the presence of the IMF is a result of this less stringent borrowing constraint.
This also explains why the borrowing constraint binds less frequently in the IMF case, as shown in
Table 4.25





t − f Binding d
∗
t
Model IMFt−1 (% GDP)
¡
% yi¢
(% GDP)( % GDP)( % )
Constrained
No IMF − 0.0 ∞ 77.79 77.79 0.63
Constrained 00 .0 ∞ 77.89 75.30 0.58
IMF 12 .59 20.94 79.07 76.48
Figure 2 shows how the baseline model changes when the conditionality rule on gi becomes
less stringent. In all four graphs, from left to right, the caps gi, i = T,N i m p o s e db yt h eI M F
are relaxed. Notice that, as conditionality is just slightly stronger (i.e., gi is reduced by less than
0.012 per cent of the GDP) than our baseline case, IMF participation and IMF lending (upper left
corner) are null. As we move to the right, and conditionality is relaxed, IMF participation and IMF
lending increase, reducing the volatilities of C and Y (upper right corner), as well as the frequency
with which the borrowing constraint binds (lower left corner).
The negative catalysis of IMF lending can also be seen in the lower right corner of Figure 2.
Since the average d∗
t/Yt is relatively unaﬀected as gi increases, the higher average ft/Yt means that
the average borrowing from private banks must be reduced. That is, dt is crowded out by ft because
of the substitution of loans from private banks by cheaper loans from the IMF, as conditionality is
relaxed and the economy’s total borrowing needs are relatively unchanged.
24In the percentage of the GDP, the small diﬀerence is due to eﬀects of the real exchange rate on the total GDP.
The levels of d
∗
t are the same in both cases.
25The debt limit as a proportion of the simulated average GDP, both with and without the IMF, is such that
it corresponds to more than the lower bound of 47 per cent, given by the maximal level for the debt-output ratio




















































Figure 2: Eﬀects of Changes in gi
It is important to understand why IMF lending does not catalyze private loans in this set-up.
In general, positive catalysis of private lending occurs when there is a reduction in the likelihood
of default induced by the IMF programs. If they can reduce the incentives of default, foreign
lenders may relax their borrowing constraint. Strictly in terms of IMF lending, abstracting from
the conditionality aspect of adjustment programs, its eﬀect on the likelihood of default is ambiguous
because of the lower interest rate charged on IMF loans, as explained in section 2.6.
As for the eﬀect of IMF conditionality on positive catalysis, it depends on how much it increases
the economy’s ex ante propensity to save. To the extent that highly indebted economies can beneﬁt
more, instantaneously, from the higher current consumption that can be achieved in case of default,
higher propensity to save and lower demand for debt means less incentive to default. Figure 3
illustrates how the ability of IMF conditionality in stimulating savings and program participation
depends on the structural parameters.
To better understand this point, ﬁrst note that the consumption of private goods is a strategic
complement (substitute) to the consumption of public goods whenever 1+ν is higher (lower) than
γ. That is, if the elasticity of substitution between c and g is lower than the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, then the marginal utility of ci
t is increasing in gi
t,f o ri = T,N, implying that the
consumption of public and private goods must change in the same direction. For the calibrated







, i = T,N, be the decision rule that determines the optimal







> gi, then conditionality is too harsh relative to the ﬁrst best, and there is
17a welfare cost of satisfying the IMF conditionality rule, since compliance implies suboptimal gi
t.
Agents can always substitute the (forced) reduction in their consumption of gi
t by consuming more
ci
t, but there is a misallocation cost. On the one hand, when private and public goods are closer
substitutes, this cost is lower and the relative incentives to adopt an IMF program are larger, but
conditionality is not likely to increase savings and, as a consequence, the catalytic eﬀect is not likely













High g c, ε , δ  and low 1 , + t t ε : 
 
•  c and g are strategic substitutes and/or g is 
not very important for overall utility; 
•  lower cost of suboptimal g
i; 
•  more incentives to sign an IMF program; 
•  small ex ante increase in savings;  
•  small reduction in the likelihood of default; 
•  IMF lending is likely to take place, but with 
No catalytic effect. 
Low g c, ε , δ  and high 1 , + t t ε : 
 
•  c and g are strategic complements and/or g is 
important in overall utility; 
•  higher cost of suboptimal g
i; 
•  less incentives to sign an IMF program; 
•  higher ex ante increase in savings;  
•  greater reduction in the likelihood of default;
•  IMF lending not very likely (prohibitive
costs); catalytic effect unobservable. 
IMF Conditionality and Structural Parameters 
 
Elasticity of substitution between c and g:  ν ε + = 1
1 ,g c  
Intertemporal slasticity of substitution between c and g: γ ε 1 1 , = + t t  
Share of ct in the CES aggregator:δ  
Figure 3: IMF Conditionality, Forced Savings, and the Catalytic Eﬀect
On the other hand, complementarity between c and g implies that the lower level of gi
t,c o m p a r e d
w i t ht h ec a s eo fn oI M F ,m u s tb ef o l l o w e db yac o r r e s p o n d i n gl o w e rl e v e lo fci
t.I f t h e r e s u l t i n g
oversaving is too costly for the country, it tends not to go to the IMF for assistance. As Figure 2
shows, the country always chooses IMFt =0when gi is set too low. Of course, where there is no
IMF program participation, the catalytic eﬀect is unobservable.






< gi. Conditionality is “soft” and
IMF participation will be positive for some gi, since the constraint gi
t ≤ gi will not be binding and,
at the same time, the country can still enjoy the beneﬁts of cheaper IMF loans in case of need. In
this situation, conditionality is not a real cost for the country, because optimal gi
t is always achieved
without violating the IMF conditionality. However, the country is not forced to save more (than
it would do freely) and, as a consequence, for each realization of the shock there is no reduction in
18the likelihood of default and no positive catalytic eﬀect takes place. On the contrary, the cheaper
IMF lending compared with that of the private banks, combined with a non-binding conditionality
rule, will induce the economy to consume more of both private and public goods. In particular, this
is true for tradable goods, which leads to higher demand for external debt, forces private banks to
be even more strict in their lending, and explains the negative catalytic eﬀect on private lending
reported above.
3.2 IMF programs as commitment devices
Consider a set-up, in which the planner does not choose gi
t optimally. Instead, the consumption of







, i = T,N,w h e r egi
L <g i
H,a n dt h ec o u n t r y
cannot commit to the low level of consumption of public goods, gi
L, even if it would be better for the
representative agent to do so. In addition, assume that IMF programs can act as a commitment
device that allows the country to choose gi
t = gi
L. That is, when the economy is not formally
under an agreement with the IMF, it must choose gi
t = gi
H, because it cannot commit with the
low-spending regime, and by adopting a program the planner would be forced to choose gi
L, because
of conditionality.
The above assumptions can be motivated by the idea that the IMF can aﬀect the domestic
political game in such a way that provides incentives for the country to implement “good” policies.
For example, Corsetti, Guimarães and Roubini (2004), in discussing the IMF’s role as international
lender of last resort, cite two possibilities: (i) the conventional view on debtor moral hazard,
whereby the IMF’s assistance reduces the incentives for costly but socially desirable policies if
it insulates the economy from crises, or (ii) the alternative view that some governments may be
willing to undertake the domestic political cost of adjustment macroeconomic policies only because
the IMF’s assistance improves their chances of success. See also Marchesi and Thomas (1999) and
Morris and Shin (2005).
Formally, in this alternative set-up, the planner’s problem is identical to the original, as de-
scribed in the previous section, except for conditionality rules (10) and (11). Given the new
assumptions, those rules change into:
if IMFt =0 : θt = θ0 =
©
DEFt ∈ {0,1}; dt ∈ D; ft =0 ; gi
t = gi
H <y i
t, i = T,N
ª
, (15)
if IMFt =1 : θt = θ1 =
©
DEFt =0 ; dt ≥ 0; 0 ≤ ft ≤ f<∞; gi
t = gi
L <g i
H, i = T,N
ª
.(16)








H, then the reduction
from gi
H to gi
L as part of IMF conditionality will force the country to save more and, at the same
time, push the country closer to what would be the optimal level of gi
t. In this case, the catalytic
eﬀect follows through, as shown in Tables 5 and 6. These tables display similar information to
Tables 3 and 4, respectively, but the results are derived using the modiﬁed model with the same
19basic calibration described previously for the original model. All parameters are the same, the only
diﬀerence being that, instead of calibrated values for the caps gi, i = T,N,w eh a v et oc a l i b r a t e
values for the exogenous levels gi
H and gi
L.
For this calibration, let k
j
g be the average ratio of consumption of public goods to GDP when
IMF = j,f o rj =0 ,1. In addition, let κ be the average reduction in the consumption of public
goods as a percentage of the GDP required by IMF programs, implying that k0
g = k1
g + κ >k 1
g.
According to Killick, Malik, and Manuel (1995), the average reduction in government spending in
IMF borrowers, when comparing before and after an IMF program, is approximately 1 per cent
of the GDP. Given κ =0 .01,w ec a l i b r a t ek0
g in order to approximate the target α =5 1 .02 per
cent for program participation. The resulting calibrated values for the exogenous consumption of
public goods are gi
H = k0
gyi =0 .2131 when IMFt =0 ,a n dgi
L = k1
gyi =0 .2031 when IMFt =1 ,
for i = T,N.
Table 5: Results III (Alternative model)
Calibration: gi
H/yi =2 1 .3%; gi
L/yi =2 0 .3%
Data Model
Variable Brazil Constrained
(%) (1980Q1−2004Q2) IMF No IMF
σc 3.63 2.39 2.57
σy 2.76 3.14 3.21
G/Y 20.60 20.81 21.32
d∗/Y 27.33 28.81 22.25
d/Y 25.97 27.32 22.25
f/Y 1.36 1.49 −
α 51.02 51.23 −
Table 5 shows that, compared with the model with no IMF, the presence of the Fund implies:
(i) a lower ratio of consumption of public goods to GDP, as required by IMF conditionality; (ii)
a higher total external debt as a percentage of the GDP, as in the original model; (iii) lower
volatilities, σc and σy; and, most importantly, (iv) a higher level of private loans as a proportion of
the GDP, suggesting a positive catalytic eﬀect of IMF lending that improves the country’s access
to international private loans (not only to total loans).





t − f Binding d
∗
t
Model IMFt−1 (% GDP)
¡
% yi¢
(% GDP)( % GDP)( % )
Constrained
No IMF − 0.02 1 .3% 79.56 79.56 0.36
Constrained 00 .02 1 .3% 83.96 81.33 0.31
IMF 12 .63 20.3% 85.95 83.33
20Table 6 show evidence of the positive catalytic eﬀect of IMF lending in this modiﬁed mode.
Note that not only is the borrowing constraint for the total external debt higher when the IMF
exists, but so is the borrowing constraint on private loans, d
∗
t −f. As a consequence, the borrowing
constraint binds less frequently in the model with the IMF.
The mechanism through which the positive catalysis takes place is based on the increase in
the country’s external payments position due to IMF conditionality that forces the country to
adjust (reduce) its level of consumption of public goods from gi
H to gi
L. Since the consumption
of private goods is not a perfect substitute for the consumption of and public goods, and given
that agents care about their future levels of consumption, the reduction in gt forces the country to
save more. By locking countries into a program of reform that ultimately improves their external
payments position, conditionality provides external investors and private banks with a high degree
of assurance about the country’s decision to repay past debt instead of defaulting. Thus, ceteris
paribus, the reduced likelihood of default allows private banks to relax the borrowing constraint.
To summarize the results so far:
1. IMF lending helps relax the borrowing constraint on total debt and, as a consequence, reduces
the volatility of private consumption and GDP.
2. When countries optimally choose their allocations of public goods, then IMF conditionality,
based on restraining the consumption of public goods, does not catalyze private capital ﬂows:
when conditionality imposes a real cost in terms of suboptimal higher savings, countries
choose not to sign IMF programs; when conditionality is not binding, countries will sign IMF
programs but will not be forced to save more.
3. When countries use the IMF as a commitment device to reduce their spending on public goods,
then IMF conditionality forces a higher level of savings, reduces the likelihood of default, and
allows private banks to be less strict in their lending, which produces the positive catalytic
eﬀect on private loans, as the Fund claims.
The remaining question is: by how much does a less stringent borrowing constraint, due to the
direct eﬀect of IMF lending and/or a positive catalytic eﬀect induced by conditionality, improve
welfare?
3.3 Welfare analysis
In terms of the welfare implications of IMF programs, there are two forces at play. The potential
cost of adopting a program is a requirement to adjust the country’s domestic absorption to the
conditionality clauses, meaning that the country has to face constraint (11)−and set gT
t and gN
t
at potentially suboptimal levels−or rule (16), in the case of the alternative model. The beneﬁts,
21besides the lower interest on IMF loans, are related to the additional amount of external funds
available for borrowing, on top of dt, which will allow a higher degree of consumption smoothing.
To assess the welfare eﬀects of IMF-supported programs, the consumption-equivalent approach
is used. In particular, we compute the per cent increase in consumption across dates and states, such
that the representative agent would receive the same utility, considering worlds with and without
the IMF. Let ϑ be this equivalent variation in consumption allocations, and let the superscripts
IMF and No IMF indicate the utility functions and value functions for the equilibrium values of
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0 =E 0
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is the value function obtained under the
assumption that there is no IMF in the world, and q =1+ϑ.
The sets S and S0 are the supports for the state of the economy in worlds with and without the
IMF, respectively. Note that the IMF is welfare improving in the case that q<1, meaning that
the consumption in a world with the option of joining an IMF program has to be decreased by ϑ
in order to generate the same level of welfare as that of a world without the IMF.
In the quantitative exercise, using the original model presented in section 2 to compare two
economies that are identical except for the fact that one operates in a world with the IMF and the
other in a world without the IMF, q is found to be equal to 0.9903. That is, in order to match
the same welfare obtained in a world where there is no option of seeking the IMF’s assistance, the
consumption sequence observed in a world with the IMF has to be decreased by 0.97 per cent.
In the alternative model, with no optimal choice of consumption of public goods, we ﬁnd that
q =0 .9958,i m p l y i n ga0.42 per cent reduction in consumption required to compensate for the
lower welfare observed in the same economy if it does not have the option of seeking the IMF’s
assistance. Therefore, results suggest that the IMF has an overall small positive eﬀect on welfare.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has presented a dynamic model of an endowment, two-goods, small open economy
subject to an endogenous borrowing constraint, where the planner can optimally choose to join an
IMF-supported adjustment program. The quantitative exercise consisted of a comparison between
one economy, which has the option of seeking the IMF’s assistance, and another economy, identical
in all aspects to the ﬁrst except that there is no IMF in the world (the counterfactual). The paper
provides answers to two questions. First, can IMF conditionality, focused on the control of the
consumption of public goods, generate a positive catalytic eﬀect, as the Fund claims? Second,
what is the welfare gain associated with IMF programs?
22In terms of the numeric results, the answer to the ﬁrst question depends on whether IMF
conditionality can force the country to save more while oﬀering enough compensation for these
additional suboptimal savings that the country can actually decide to sign an IMF program. If
the consumption of public goods is chosen optimally by the central planner, then whenever the
conditionality rule is too strict (relative to the optimal level for the no-IMF case), the country will
not participate in IMF programs. The oversaving implied by conditionality is too costly for the
economy.
On the other hand, when conditionality clauses are redundant (because the country’s optimal
consumption of public goods is lower than the level determined by conditionality), not forcing the
economy to save, then IMF participation is positive, but there is no improvement in the prospective
for repayment of the external debt by the borrowing country. It is the opposite: since conditionality
is not a real cost and the country can still borrow at a lower interest rate from the IMF, private
banks must be more strict to avoid default. This generates a negative catalytic eﬀect of IMF lending
on private capital ﬂows, although the borrowing constraint on total external debt may be relaxed.
Only by increasing a country’s external payments position may the Fund help the country
signal to foreign private lenders that the opportunity cost of defaulting has become higher, and
the likelihood of debt repudiation reduced. This, in turn, allows international private creditors to
relax their borrowing constraint. This situation can occur when the planner does not optimally
choose the allocations of consumption of public goods. In that case, under the assumption that
the IMF can act as a commitment device that allows the economy to operate with a lower level
of consumption of public goods than it would otherwise, IMF conditionality produces a positive
catalytic eﬀect on private capital ﬂows. Catalysis occurs because the reduction in consumption
forces the country to save more and, at the same time, pushes the economy closer to what would
be the optimal allocation. As a result, the likelihood of default is reduced and private banks can
relax their borrowing constraints. Both the direct (additional source of loans) and indirect (positive
catalysis on private loans) eﬀects of IMF lending imply a less stringent borrowing constraint that
allows more room for consumption smoothing.
A less stringent borrowing constraint, however, resulting from either direct lending or positive
catalysis of private ﬂows, is not a measure of the “success” or “failure” of IMF programs. The welfare
eﬀects associated with IMF lending do not seem to be very quantitatively important. It is true
that the less stringent borrowing constraint allows the country easier access to international capital
markets and, as such, improves the country’s consumption-smoothing opportunities. The reduction
in volatility does produce welfare improvements, but for the parametrization used in the calibration
exercise, which was set to approximate the Brazilian economy during the 1980Q1−2004Q2 period,
IMF lending generates improvements in welfare equivalent to less than 1 per cent in additional
consumption.
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28Appendix A: On IMF Programs
This appendix brieﬂy describes the process of setting up an agreement between a member country
and the IMF, and provides a summarizes the literature on evaluations of IMF-supported adjustment
programs.
A.1 Setting Up an IMF Program
The Fund has a mandate to oﬀer ﬁnancial and technical assistance to members experiencing ex-
ternal account imbalances on the condition that the recipient country agrees to implement speciﬁc
economic policy measures intended to improve the country’s overall economic situation and reduce
its vulnerabilities. These agreed-upon policy actions are known as IMF conditionality and usually
include intermediate goals that must be undertaken as a condition for the country to receive sub-
sequent tranches over the duration of the program, usually one to three years. These targets are
often related to ﬁscal and monetary austerity measures, aimed at reducing domestic absorption.
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a rationale of the IMF’s behaviour, one
possible reason for this observed reaction is the Fund’s primary goal of improving the external
payments position of its members, as stated in its Articles of Agreement.26 In that sense, these
policies may be understood as a way to force borrowing countries to save more in order to improve
their current account balances.
A country that wishes to withdraw funds up to 25 per cent of its own quota within the IMF
(in the so-called ﬁrst credit tranche programs) can do so almost automatically, with only minimal
requirements and no discussion or commitment to speciﬁc economic policy measures. To use the
Fund’s resources beyond that threshold, countries must almost always sign a formal agreement and
accept conditionality. Mussa and Savastano (1999) describe the underlying process for signing an
IMF-supported program as consisting of six broadly deﬁned phases. First, in the inception phase,
a country member explicitly requests the Fund’s assistance. Then a blueprint is prepared by the
Fund’s staﬀ to be used as a basis for the negotiation process. After an agreement is reached, a letter
of intent summarizes the outcome of the negotiations and all aspects of the program. The letter
of intent is sent to the Executive Board for approval. Disbursements of the credit tranches follow
automatically if the agreed-upon performance clauses are met as assessed by the Fund’s monitoring
of the country’s situation. This phase lasts until the completion of the program.27
26Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm.
27Edwards (1989) summarizes the steps leading to the ﬁnal design of an IMF program, starting with the evaluation
of the country’s situation, deﬁning the target variables, and envisaging the course of policy actions.
29A.2 Evaluating IMF Programs
Many studies have tried to evaluate IMF programs using reduced-form econometric models, applied
to cross-country samples. The two most common methodological problems in evaluating the IMF’s
performance based on cross-country econometric studies are both the diﬃculty in ﬁnding a good
counterfactual against which to compare IMF programs and the need to control for selection bias
due to self-selection of countries that seek a program. The counterfactual issue arises because the
proper standard for measuring program eﬀects, in terms of key variables, should be a comparison
of the macroeconomic outcomes under a program with the outcomes that would have emerged in
the absence of a program, which is unobservable and must be approximated. Unfortunately, as
Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni and Schadler (2000) point out, results are very sensitive to the diﬀerent
techniques used to approximate the counterfactual.
In terms of the selection bias problem, since countries self-select to IMF programs, the outcome
observed after a program is likely to be a consequence of both the initial conditions and the program
itself. These pre-program conditions would probably be very diﬀerent in a country that ended up
seeking IMF assistance, compared with the (counterfactual) situation in which the same country
decided not to adopt an IMF program. If the two eﬀects cannot be disentangled, the results will
be biased.28
These cross-country reduced-form econometric studies provide some “stylized facts” regarding
IMF-supported stabilization programs. Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 summarize the results found in
the literature regarding the pre-program characteristics of countries that seek the IMF’s assistance,
the eﬀects of IMF programs on some selected macroeconomic variables,29 and the catalytic eﬀect,
respectively. They suggest the following:
1. countries that seek the IMF’s assistance have diﬀerent initial, pre-program, conditions than
those that do not seek the Fund’s help;
2. IMF programs seem to help countries improve their external payments positions;
3. inﬂation rates are not aﬀected by the implementation of an IMF program, while the evidence
is mixed for growth; and,
4. there is no strong evidence that IMF lending acts as a “catalyst” to other (private) capital
ﬂows, but there is good indirect evidence that IMF programs can help countries improve their
access to international private capital markets.
28The preferred approach in current econometric studies to approximate the counterfactual is the so-called gen-
eralized evaluation estimator (GEE), ﬁrst suggested by Goldstein and Montiel (1986), and further popularized by
Khan (1990), Conway (1994), and Hutchison (2001), among others. Although not without criticism (Dicks-Mireaux,
Mecagni, and Schadler 2000; Barro and Lee 2002), the GEE approach also tries to control for the potential selection-
bias problem.
29Table A.2 is a modiﬁed and updated version of Table 1 in Haque and Khan (1998).
30Regarding the ﬁrst point, evidence that program countries diﬀer from non-program countries
in terms of initial conditions isprovided by Joyce (1992), Edwards and Santaella (1993), San-
taella (1995), Bird (1996), and Knight and Santaella (1997), among others. Table A.1 summarizes
pre-program characteristics of countries that seek the IMF’s ﬁnancial assistance according to 12
independent econometric studies. Seven out of eight studies ﬁnd that a worse current account po-
sition increases the likelihood of a country adopting an IMF program, and four out of ﬁve studies
ﬁnd the same in terms of the overall balance of payments. In general, prior to entering a program,
IMF borrowers experience−besides worse external payments positions−higher external debt, lower
level of international reserves, more overvalued currencies and lower levels of both GDP per capita
and/or GDP growth rates. IMF borrowers also tend to follow more expansionary economic policies.
Table A.1 
Pre-Program Characteristics of Countries that Seek the IMF’s Financial Assistance 
        Effects on the likelihood of an IMF program 
  No.  of  No.  of Sample              Past 
Study progs.  countries  period  BoP CA  R  d
*  π e G
  M
  y
  IMF 
                         
GM (1986)  68  58  1974–81  – 
*  – 
* …  …  + 
* … … …  – 
* … 
ES (1992)  48  31  1954–71  …  –  – 




Joyce (1992)  72  45  1980–84  …  – 
* – 




Conway (1994)  217  73  1976–86  …  + 
*  – 
* + 
*  … … … …  – 
* + 
* 







* 0  – 
* … 
Bird  (1996)  …  …  …  – …  –  ?  … + …  …  –  + 
KS (1997)  …  91  1973–91  +  – 
* – 
* + 






PV (2000)  678  135  1951–90  – 
* …  – 
* + 
* …  …  + 
* …  …  + 
Edwards (2000)  …  106  1979–95  …  …  – 
* …  – 
* …  –  + 
* – 
* … 
Hutchison  (2001)  461  67  1975–97 … –  …  …  + … +  +  – 
* … 
BL (2002)  …  80  1975–99  …  …  – 
* …  … … … …  +  /  – 
* … 
BHJ (2004)  371  90  1980–96  …  – 
* – 
* + 
* 0  … – 
* 0  – 
* … 
Expected  sign: – –  – +  + + + +  –  + 
Right  sign: 4/5 7/8 10/10  5/7 4/7 3/4 6/8 5/7 11/11 4/4 
Significant  and  right  sign: 3/5 5/8 9/10  5/7 2/7 1/4 5/8 4/7 10/11 2/4 




BoP = Balance of Payments; CA = Current Account; R = reserves; d
* = total external debt; π = inflation; e = exchange rate 
(increase = depreciation); G = government spending or deficit; M = money or credit creation; y = per capita GDP or GDP growth. 
 
GM =  Goldstein and Montiel (1986); ES = Edwards and Santaella (1993); KS = Knight and Santaella (1997); 
PV = Przeworski and Vreeland (2000); BL = Barro and Lee (2002); BHJ = Bird, Hussain, and Joyce (2004) 
 
The second item in the list is the strongest empirical regularity found in the cross-country
studies. Both the current account and the balance of payments seem to improve following an
agreement with the Fund, which seems to be consistent with the idea that improving the borrower
country’s external payments situation would be the Fund’s principal objective and the focus of its
analytical approach.30 According to Table A.2, the balance of payments improves in 7 out of 9
studies and the current account in 8 out of 11.
30See Mussa and Savastano (1999) and Mody and Saravia (2003).
31I nt h ec a s eo ft h ee ﬀects on inﬂation, only 2 out of 15 studies manage to ﬁnd a negative and
signiﬁcant eﬀect of IMF programs on inﬂation, while one study ﬁnds a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect.
Several studies indicate a negative eﬀect, but regression coeﬃcients are generally not statistically
signiﬁcant at standard levels. In terms of the growth eﬀects of IMF programs, results are mixed
and not robust to the methodology, period covered, and types of countries and programs being
analyzed. Although 10 out of 19 studies ﬁnd positive eﬀects of IMF programs on growth and/or
per capita GDP, only 3 studies report statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects (Table A.2).
Table A.2 
Effects of IMF Programs on Selected MacroeconomicVariables 
        Effects of IMF program on: 
  No. of  No. of  Sample             
Study Progs.  countries  period  BoP CA




Before - After       
        
RS (1978)  79  …  1963–72  0  …  0  …  – 
*    + 
Connors (1979)  31  23  1973–77  …  +  0  0  …  0 
Pastor (1987)  …  18  1965– 81  + 
* 0  + 
* …  …  0 
Edwards (1989)  34  34  1983  …  +  +  0  –  – / + 
Schadler et al. (1993)  …  19  1983–93  +  –  –  –  ?  + 
KMM (1995)  …  16  1979–85  + 
* + 
* – 
*    –  –  –  /  + 
With - Without                   
Donovan (1981)  12  12  1970–76  …  …  –  …  …  + 
Donovan (1982)  78  44  1971–80  +  +  –  …  …  – 
Gylfason (1987)  32  14  1977–79  + 
* …  0  …  0  (– 
* ) 0 
ES (1992)  48  31  1954–71  + 
* + 
* – …  –  –  /  + 
      Generalized evaluation                 
GM (1986)  68  58  1974–81  –  –  +  …  …  – 
Khan (1990)  259  69  1973–88  + 
* + 
* – …  … – 
*    
Conway (1994)  217  73  1976–86  …  + 
* – – 
*     +  – / + 
* 
PV (2000)  678  135  1951–90  …  …  …  …  …  – 
*    
D-MMS (2000)  …  61  1986–91  …  …  –  …  …  + 
* 
Hutchison (2001)  461  67  1975–97  …  …  …  …  …  – 
*    
IV Estimation                   
BL (2002)  …  80  1975–99  …  …  …  …  …  0 / –
* 
Easterly (2005)  …  …  1980–99  …  …  …  …  …  + 
      Other                   
BMO (2004)  …  29  1980–02  …  + 
* – 
*    … …  + 
* 
Right sign: (+)  7/9 (+) 8/11 (–) 9/15  (–)  3/5  (–) 5/7  (+) 10/19 
Significant and right sign: 5/9  5/11  2/15  1/5  2/7  3/19 




BoP = Balance of Payments; CA = Current Account; π = inflation; G = government spending or government deficit; M = 
money or credit creation; y = per capita GDP or GDP growth. 
 
RS = Reichmann and Stillson (1978); KMM = Killick, Malik, and Manuel (1995); ES = Edwards and Santaella (1993);  
GM =  Goldstein and Montiel (1986); PV = Przeworski and Vreeland (2000); D-MMS = Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, and 
Schadler (2000);  BL = Barro and Lee (2002); BMO = Bordo, Mody, and Oomes (2004). 
The last point, regarding the catalytic eﬀect of IMF programs, is more directly related to this
paper. In the literature, this expression is used to broadly characterize the ability of the IMF to
facilitate access to international capital markets (Cottarelli and Giannini 2002, 5−7). The Fund
claims that positive catalysis is a very important feature of its lending, since it provides only a small
portion of a country’s external ﬁnancing requirements and the attached conditionality clauses help
32to reassure investors and the oﬃcial community, acting as an important lever, or catalyst, for
attracting other funds.31
Table A.3 
Evidence of the Catalytic Effect of IMF Lending 
  No. of  No. of  Sample     
Study progs.  countries  period  Catalysis?
  Dependent variable 
Emprirical         
Ozler (1978)  …  26  1968–81  Negative 
*  Spreads on bank loans 
KMM (1995)  …  16  1979–85  Negative  Net capital flows 
Rodrik (1996)  …  …  1970–93  Negative  Net private capital flows 
BR-1 (1997)  …  90  1974–89  Negative  New lending commitments 
BMR (2000)  17  17  1970s–1990s          ?   
Edwards (2000)  …  106  1979–95  Negative, ?  Net capital flows 
BR-2 (2002)  …  117  1977–99  Negative, ?  Net capital flows 
Marchesi (2003)  …  87  1983–95  Positive 
*  Commercial debt rescheduling 
MS (2003)  259  69  1973–88  Positive 
*  Bond issuance and spreads 
BMO (2004)  …  29  1980–02  Positive 
* Gross  capital  flows 
EKM (2005)  678  135  1991–02  Positive  Bond spreads 
Theoretical          
CGR (2004)        possible   
M-Shin (2005)        possible   




KMM = Killick, Malik, and Manuel (1995); BR-1 = Bird and Rowlands (1997);  
BMR = Bird, Mori, and Rowlands (2000); BR-2 = Bird and Rowlands (2002); MS = Mody and Saravia (2003); 
BMO = Bordo, Mody, and Oomes (2004); EKM = Eichengreen, Kletzer, and Mody (2005);  
CGR = Corsetti, Guimarães, and Roubini (2004); M-Shin = Morris and Shin (2005). 
 
Table A.3 reports the results found in 11 empirical and 2 theoretical studies regarding the cat-
alytic eﬀect of IMF programs. Earlier studies, such as Ozler (1993), Killick, Malik, and Manuel
(1995), Bird and Rowlands (1997, 2001) and Edwards (2000), ﬁnd no evidence of a strong posi-
tive catalytic eﬀect. Overall, six studies, among which ﬁve try to measure catalysis through the
response of net capital ﬂows following IMF programs, ﬁnd negative, often not signiﬁcant, eﬀects.
However, more recent papers seem to be more successful in ﬁnding signs of positive catalysis by
IMF programs, in terms of facilitating private debt rescheduling (Marchesi 2003), by allowing more
frequent and more favourable (lower spreads) bond debt issuance by sovereign countries (Mody
and Saravia 2003; Eichengreen, Kletzer, and Mody 2005), and keeping capital ﬂows in program
countries (Bordo, Mody, and Oomes 2004). Theoretical predictions by Morris and Shin (2005) and
Corsetti, Guimarães, and Roubini (2004) suggest that, although IMF programs cannot catalyze
capital ﬂows to countries in severe distress, they can help countries in a vulnerable but not insol-
vent condition. Bordo, Mody, and Oomes (2004) and Mody and Saravia (2003) empirically conﬁrm
these predictions.
31See “What Is The IMF?” at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/what.htm.
33Appendix B: Calibration
This appendix provides a more detailed description of the calibration process shown in Table 2
(section 3 of the main text).
The artiﬁcial economy is calibrated for the Brazilian data and refers to a normalized, long-run
path for the system, in which E(zt)=0and the values of the tradable endowment and the real
exchange rate are yT = p =1 . On this reference path, the economy is assumed to participate in
an IMF program with frequency α. For instance, the frequency at which Brazil was under an IMF
program during the period of reference was 50 out of 98 quarters, which implies α =0 .5102.
Let Y = yT + pyN, d and f be the long-run average levels of the total endowment, private
and IMF loans, in units of tradable goods, respectively. In addition, denote gT and gN as the
long-run average values for the consumption of public goods in tradable and non-tradable goods,
respectively. The normalized values for yT and p, combined with the long-run ratios kT = yT/Y,
kd = d/Y , kf = f/Y,a n dkg =
¡
gT + pgN¢
/Y taken from the data (Table 1), imply the calibrated
long-run averages Y =1 /kT =2 .4722, yN =1 /kT − 1=1 .4722, d = kd/kT =0 .6420,a n df =
kf/kT =0 .0336. Under the additional assumption that the share of tradables in total consumption
of public goods is also equal to kT,t h e ngT = kg =0 .2057 and gN = kg (1/kT − 1) = 0.3028.






, such that dt,d ∗
t ∈D ⊆ R, zt ∈ ΩZ, ft ∈F ⊆ R+,a n dIMFt ∈ {0,1},r e l i e s
on the discrete sets e D, e ΩZ,a n de F. To capture the potential movements of the simulated series for




max},a ne v e n l ys p a c e dd∗−grid
(except for d∗
t =0and d∗
t = d + f)w i t hNd = 602 points. Given the average Y ,t h el i m i t s
d∗
min = −1.0 and d∗
max =7 .0 imply debt-to-output ratios approximately in the range [−0.4,2.83],
and are appropriately chosen to include the ergodic space. Negative values represent assets instead
of liabilities.
To calibrate the exogenous stochastic process for the tradable endowment shock, we proceed
as follows. First, we detrend the data on tradable output by removing a smooth trend with an
HP ﬁlter and a smoothing parameter of 1600, for quarterly data. Then, we estimate a ﬁrst-order
autoregressive process of the type zt = ρzt−1 +εt,w i t hεt v N (0,σε), using ordinary least squares
(OLS) on the HP-detrended data against its one-period lagged value. The autocorrelation (ρ)
and the volatility (σε) parameters obtained from the regression are ρ =0 .7188 and σε =0 .0229,
respectively.32 Finally, the estimated stochastic process is discretized into a ﬁve-point Markov






















2 =0 .5227 and estimated parameters (p-values in parentheses) e α0 = −0.0272 (0.9073), e ρ =0 .7188 (0.000),
and e σε =0 .0229.
34chain, using Tauchen’s (1986) procedure, resulting in an evenly spaced grid e ΩZ = {z1,...,z 5},s u c h
that z3 =0 , z1 = −z5 =0 .0989,a n dz2 = −z4 =0 .0494,33 and in an underlying probability






0.3423 0.5984 0.0591 0.0002 0.0000
0.0467 0.5669 0.3744 0.0120 0.0000
0.0016 0.1611 0.6746 0.1611 0.0016
0.0000 0.0120 0.3744 0.5669 0.0467










, consisting of only two possible choices. The
economy gets ft =0when the planner chooses IMFt =0 . As previously mentioned, the assumption
that r>r ∗ ensures that ft = f whenever IMFt =1 ,w h i c ha l l o w se F to have only two points and
substantially reduces the dimension of the state-space and the computational cost of the numerical
solution discussed below. The IMF standard loan, f, is calibrated to match the average value of
IMF loans as a proportion of the GDP, given by kf. Notice that, since the country will participate
in an IMF program with frequency α, the long-run average IMF loan, f, has to be equal to αf.
Given the values of α and f deﬁned above, f is set to 0.0659, which corresponds to approximately
2.7 per cent of the targeted average total output, Y . Accordingly, the caps gi, i = T,N,t ob e
satisﬁed as the conditionality rule when IMFt =1 , are calibrated to approximate the frequency
α.T h e y a r e s e t t o gT =0 .2094 and gN =0 .3087, which correspond to about 21 per cent of the
endowments.
The value for the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity substitution (or, equivalently, for the
CRRA case, the risk-aversion parameter) is set to γ =1 .5, which is standard.34 The exogenous
interest rate is set at the average level that the Brazilian government pays on its sovereign debt, as
represented by the Federative Republic of Brazil’s C bonds. Here, r is considered to be the quarterly
equivalent of the average real annual rate on the U.S. government bonds (r∗ =4 . per cent per year,
or 0.81 per cent per quarter, using the U.S. CPI inﬂation rate) plus the average spread paid on the
C bonds (803.4 basis points, or ζ ' 8 per cent per year).35 T h er e s u l ti sr = r∗ +ζ =2 .82 per cent
per quarter. In addition, the parameter ν is set to 2.15, which is inside the range of values usually
observed in empirical studies (Bouakez and Rebei 2003), and implies an elasticity of substitution




such that the sample average is equal
to 1. Although, the points z1,...,z5 cannot be interpreted as percentage deviations of the trend, they are such that
y
T
t > 0 at all times, since we impose y




in the OLS estimations produces similar results
in terms of percentage deviations of the HP trend.
34For instance, the value used here is the mid-range value of two very common alternatives, γ =1 .001 or γ =2 ,
used by Greenwood Hercovitz, and Huﬀman (1988) and Mendoza (1991), for example. Issler and Piqueira (2000)
estimate γ =1 .7, using Brazilian data and the same type of utility function used in this paper. The results of the
simulation of the model are virtually the same if one uses this value instead of γ =1 .5.
35For the average risk-free real interest rate, the 10-year-maturity U.S. government bond is used, since its maturity
is comparable to that of the C bonds. Because of data limitations, the average spread for the C bonds refers to the
period 1995Q1−2004Q2.
35between c and g equal to 0.3175.
Following the traditional hypothesis used in the small open-economy literature, in order to avoid
a unit root in the current account, the subjective discount factor must satisfy β (1 + r)=1and,
thus, is set to β =0 .9713. This value of β is consistent with estimations by Issler and Piqueira
(2000), using the same utility function used here, for the Brazilian economy.
The share of private consumption goods in the CES composite consumption index is calibrated
to δ =0 .9850 in order to match the average of total government consumption as a proportion of the
GDP, kg. The parameter governing the output loss observed in default states is set to λ =0 .9750,
which implies output losses of 2.50 per cent during default episodes and helps to approximate the
target kd. This value is (roughly) in line with the empirical ﬁndings by Chuhan and Sturzenegger
(2003).
For known values of kT, kd,a n dkg, the normalized version of condition (12), computed at the
long-run average target path, implies a one-to-one relationship between ωc and µc.36 Because of the
non-linear nature of the model, which in principle should induce agents to react asymmetrically to
positive and negative shocks, a “deterministic steady state” may not be relevant to reﬂect the long-
run average state of the system. Ideally, in this case, a more precise method of calibration should be
carried out through the solution of the whole model for a given set of parameters (all of them), and
successive improvements should be made until the target average values are obtained. However,
this non-linearity does not seem to be important here and the calibration procedure used, based
on a deterministic steady state, is able to generate the target averages quite accurately. Among
the diﬀerent possible combinations of ωc and µc that satisfy that relationship, ωc =0 .0893 and
µc =4 .66 (which imply an elasticity of substitution between cT and cN equal to 0.1767)a r ec h o s e n
in order to match the total output volatility σy =2 .76 p e rc e n to b s e r v e di nt h eB r a z i l i a nd a t a . 37
The corresponding parameters for gT and gN are set to µg = µc,a n dωg = ωc,b ys y m m e t r y .
36At the long-run average, given the two resource constraints and the normalized version of condition (12), the





(1 − kT)(1− kg)
kT (1 − kg) − rkd − r∗kf
(1+µc),−1
.
37In principle, both parameters, ωc and µc, are important to the volatility of the real exchange rate, p. However,
since the business cycle statistics are usually computed on the log-variables to control for scale eﬀects, only µc will
have an impact on the volatility of (the log of) p. For instance, by taking the logarithm on both sides of equation







, implying that the ratio between the volatilities of
(the logs of) pt and c
T
t , as measured by their standard deviations, must be constant and equal to (1 + µc). Because




and the total consumption of private
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Ct = c
T
t + ptc
N
t

and public goods

Gt = g
T
t + ptg
N
t

.
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